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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court the final order of the Utah District Court is appealable 
and jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(j) (1953 as 
amended)• 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Does the Utah District Court have the authority 
and/or power to invalidate a California Court order and 
judgment with regard to California State real property? 
B. Does the Utah District Court have jurisdiction over 
real property located in the State of California in probate 
proceedings? 
C. Where a conflict of probate laws exists between the 
deceased's state of domicile and the state where the deceased 
owns real property, which law takes precedence? 
D. Did the Utah District Court abuse its discretion by 
ordering the personal representative of the deceased's estate 
to reobtain and redistribute property already distributed 
pursuant to an order and judgment of the California Superior 
Court? 
E. Is the judgment of the California Superior Court res 
judicata with regard to the issue of California real property 
and therefore entitled to full faith and credit by the Utah 
courts. 
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F. Should the personal representative be required to 
file a bond for property not includeable in the Utah estate of 
the deceased and already distributed pursuant to a current 
court order? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The order of the District Court below was made as a 
matter of law and therefore the Supreme Court is not required 
to accept the conclusions of the District Court but shall 
review the questions of law independently. Avila v. Winn, 794 
P.2d 20 (Utah 1990); Henrettv v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d 
506 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no Utah statutes determinative of the issues 
upon appeal before the Court and this appears to be a matter 
of first impression in the State. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third 
Judicial District Court, for the District of Utah, the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, wherein the Court found 
as a matter of law a prior judgment of a California Superior 
Court "wholly invalid" with regard to California real property 
and ordered said property redistributed according to Utah Law 
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and further ordered the Personal Representative to post bond 
in an amount equal to one-half of the value of said California 
real property. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case 
Below. 
At trial held before the Third District Court in 
February, 1986, the will of the deceased was upheld and his 
estate passed to Linda Anglesey. Said judgment was appealed 
by Appellee Robert Lee Jones (hereinafter "Jones") who had 
been disinherited and reversed on the issue of his status as 
a pretermitted child and remanded for further proceedings 
before the District Court. 
Subsequent to the above-referenced trial, ancillary 
proceedings were brought in the Superior Court of California 
regarding California real property owned by the deceased. The 
California court held that pursuant to California law, Jones 
was disinherited and distributed said real property to Linda 
Anglesey. 
In compliance with the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, Personal Representative Linda Anglesey prepared a 
Final Accounting awarding one-half (1/2) of all personal 
property of the deceased as well as one-half (1/2) of all real 
property located in the State of Utah to Jones. The 
California real property, previously distributed by the 
California Superior Court, was not included in said Final 
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Accounting. Personal Representative Linda Anglesey further 
petitioned the Court to close the estate. 
Jones objected to the Final Accounting and Petition to 
Close the Estate and Counter-petitioned that the Personal 
Representative be removed or in the alternative that a 
personal representative's bond be required. Said Counter-
Petition was objected to by the estate and by Personal 
Representative Linda Anglesey. 
Third District Court Judge James S. Sawaya, upon hearing, 
held that as a matter of law the judgment of the California 
Superior Court was "wholly invalid", that Jones was entitled 
to one-half (1/2) of the California real property, and that 
the Personal Representative was required to post a bond for 
one-half (1/2) of the estate. This is in appeal by the 
estate, by and through Personal Representative Linda Anglesey, 
of said final order. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. On May 1, 1985, Herbert Lee Jones (hereinafter "the 
deceased") executed a Last Will and Testament prior to his 
death on July 5, 1985. 
2. Said written will named Petitioner Linda M. 
(Cameron) Anglesey "to be Executor [Sic] and sole beneficiary 
to my Estate". 
3. Petitioner Linda M. (Cameron) Anglesey, Testator's 
daughter (hereinafter "Linda Anglesey" or "the Personal 
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Representative") filed a Petition for Formal Probate 
subsequent thereto on July 19, 1985 to which an Objection was 
filed by Robert Lee Jones, (hereinafter "Jones") Testator's 
son, claiming that the Testator lacked testamentary capacity, 
that Linda Anglesey had exerted undue influence over the 
Testator and that Jones was a pretermitted child pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-302(1)(a). 
4. Trial was held before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson of the Third District Court on February 10, 1986, 
After full presentation of the evidence, the court found that 
the Testator had the capacity to execute a will in May, 1985; 
that he was not unduly influenced on said date; that the 
entire will was completed May 1, 1985; and that the language 
of the will was sufficient to show that the Testator intended 
to disinherit his son and therefore Robert Lee Jones was not 
a pretermitted child pursuant to Utah law. (R.at 110-110). 
5. On April 15, 1986 the Court entered the Formal 
Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal Representative of 
Linda Anglesey. (R. at 114-115). 
6. Thereafter, an ancillary proceeding was filed by the 
Personal Representative Linda Anglesey in the Superior Court 
of the State of California, County of Los Angeles for the 
distribution of the deceased's real property located in the 
State of California. (R. at 554-561). 
1. Jones was provided notice of said ancillary 
proceeding, and all proceedings in conjunction thereto. (R. at 
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554-561). 
8. A hearing upon said ancillary proceeding was held 
November 7, 1987 before California Superior Court Judge J. 
Kimball Walker wherein the Court found that the decedent 
intended to omit his son Robert Lee Jones from his Will and 
that pursuant to California lawf the entirety of the 
California real property in the estate would be distributed to 
Linda Anglesey. (R. at 530-538, 448-454). Said Decree was not 
appealed nor did Jones appear at any of said proceedings. (R. 
at 549, 554 - 561). 
9. The judgment of the above-referenced Utah District 
Court decision, however, was appealed by Jones, and the Utah 
Court of Appeals, in a written opinion, ruled that all aspects 
of the lower court's decision would be affirmed with the 
exception of the pretermitted child issue. The Court of 
Appeals found that Jones was pretermitted child pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 75-2-302 (l)(a) and remanded the case 
for entry of judgment consistent with such a finding. No 
costs were awarded. Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345 
(Utah App. 1988). 
10. Personal Representative Linda Anglesey thereafter 
submitted a Petition for Entry of Order and Decree in 
Accordance with Decision of Utah Court of Appeals and Petition 
for Approval of Final Settlement, Discharge of Personal 
Representative and Closing the Administration of the Estate as 
well as a Summary of Account for all real property of the 
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decedent's estate located in the State of Utah and all 
personal property of the decedent's estate wheresoever 
situated. (R. at 416-420). 
11. All real property of the decedent located in the 
State of California has been distributed in accordance with 
the ancillary proceeding filed in that state and the court 
decree therefrom and was not included in said Summary of 
Account. (R. at 421-422). 
12. Jones objected to the Personal Representative's 
Petition and counter-petitioned the court for an order 
removing Linda Anglesey as Personal Representative of the 
deceased's estate, appointing Robert Lee Jones as Personal 
Representative or in the alternative requiring that Personal 
Representative Linda Anglesey file a bond in the amount of 
one-half (1/2) the value of the estate. (R. at 461-471). 
13. Personal Representative Linda Anglesey objected to 
Robert Lee Jones' Counter-Petition on the grounds that the 
Utah estate had nothing to distribute after the payment of 
debts and therefore a bond was unnecessary. (R. at 480-485). 
14. Judge Kenneth Rigtrup of the Third District Court 
ordered that the Personal Representative be temporarily 
restrained from further transferring or disposing of the 
estate property pending resolution of the matter. (R. at 473-
476). 
15. On January 16, 1990 hearing on the above-referenced 
petitions was held before the Honorable James S. Sawaya of the 
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Third District Court. Without discussing any of the issues of 
fact, the Court ruled as a matter of law that the California 
judgment was wholly invalid, that the California real property 
was includeable in the Utah estate, that each distributee was 
entitled to one-half of such, and that a bond should be filed 
by Personal Representative Linda Anglesey for one-half (1/2) 
of said estate. (R. at 550 - 552). 
16. The estate of the deceased Herbert Lee Jones, by and 
through its Personal Representative Linda Anglesey, appealed 
the order of the District as inconsistent with the previously 
entered order and judgment of the California Court. (R. at 
562). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The courts have been nearly unanimous in upholding the 
principles set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1900 that a 
foreign court is without subject matter jurisdiction to affect 
the title of real property located outside its territorial 
limits. This has been especially true in cases involving the 
probate of a will where real property is left in a state other 
than the domicile of the deceased, and a conflict of laws 
exists between the states regarding said probate estate. In 
such cases the courts have uniformly held that the law and 
judgment of the situs state controls. 
In some instances, foreign state courts have attempted to 
use their personal jurisdiction over the parties to avoid the 
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above principle, or argued that the first judgment entered 
must be granted "full faith and credit" regardless of the 
location of the real property. Such attempts and arguments 
however have been unsuccessful and the courts have refused to 
make exceptions to said principles. 
Utah, therefore, must guard its own sovereignty and not 
throw away its exclusive jurisdiction over real property 
located in Utah by adopting law to the contrary regarding 
foreign situated real property. This is particularly 
important where Utah can only enforce such a law where it has 
personal jurisdiction over the necessary parties. 
Finally, the order of the court below requiring a 
personal representatives bond is unnecessary and inappropriate 
as there is no property within the Utah estate of the 
deceased, the California property is not includeable therein, 
and attempting to coerce the return of property already 
distributed by the California courts by means of personal 
jurisdiction over the distributee is contrary to common law 
and an inappropriate exercise of juridical authority. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT MAY NOT INVALIDATE THE JUDGMENT OF 
A CALIFORNIA COURT REGARDING CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY 
The United States Supreme Court referred to the following 
as a "well-defined and elementary legal principle". 
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It is a doctrine firmly established that 
the law of a state in which land is 
situated controls and governs it 
transmission by will or its passage in 
case of intestacy. Clarke v. Clarke 178 
U.S. 186, 190, 20 S.Ct 873, 44 L.Ed. 1028 
(1900). (String cite omitted). 
Such black letter law has been long established regarding 
real property as devised by will. The Restatement 2d of 
Conflicts provides as follows: 
Section 240. Construction of a Will 
Devising Land. 
1. A will insofar as it devises an 
interest in land is construed in accor-
dance with the rules of construction of 
the state designated for this purpose in 
the will. 
2. In the absence of such a 
designation, the will is construed in 
accordance with the rules of construction 
that would be applied by the courts of 
the situs. 
Section 239. Validity and Effect of Will 
of Land. 
1. Whether a will transfers an 
interest in land and the nature of the 
interest transferred are determined by 
the law that would be applied by the 
courts of the situs. 
2. These courts would usually apply their 
own local law in determining such questions. 
The policy behind the above principles is obvious. 
States, which so jealously guard their sovereignty, must be 
permitted to control the disposition of real property within 
their borders. 
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A. The U.S. Supreme Court Case of Clarke v. Clarke is 
the Cornerstone Case Involving the Subject Conflict of Laws 
Issue. 
Although decided in 1900, the Clarke case Supra has never 
been reversed nor modified. In Clarke a conflict of laws 
existed between the state of South Carolina where the deceased 
was domiciled and Connecticut where the deceased owned real 
property at the time of her death. The Supreme Court of 
Errors of Connecticut had held that, while the disposition of 
personal property might be governed by the law of the 
domicile, real estate within Connecticut was controlled by the 
law of Connecticut. 
The appellant in Clarke argued unsuccessfully that a 
conflicting decision of a South Carolina Court pre-dated that 
of the Connecticut Courts and therefore the decree of the 
South Carolina court construing the willf and not 
Connecticut's own laws of construction, should determine the 
rights of the parties as to Connecticut real estate. 
The United States Supreme Court concluded, however, that: 
[t]his is but to contend that what cannot 
be done directly can be accomplished by 
indirection, and that the fundamental 
principle which gives to a sovereignty an 
exclusive jurisdiction over the land 
within its borders is in legal effect 
dependent upon the nonexistence of a 
decree of a court of another sovereignty 
determining the status of such land. 
Manifestly, however, an authority cannot 
be said to be exclusive, or even to exist 
at all, where its exercise may be 
frustrated at any time. Id at 1992. 
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In the case at bar, Appellee Jones contends that Utah has 
granted itself jurisdiction over all real property wheresoever 
situated by virtue of Utah Code Ann. Section 75-1-201(33) and 
urged the District Court to use its personal jurisdiction over 
Personal Representative Anglesey to force her to reobtain 
possession of the California real property for the estate. 
Not surprisingly such is only possible because Linda Anglesey 
is also sole devisee of said real property. Such a situation, 
however, was foreseen by the Court in Clarke which reasoned as 
follows: 
If, however, by the law as enforced in 
Connecticut, land in Connecticut owned by 
Mrs. Clarke at her decease was real 
estate for all purposes, despite the 
provisions contained in her will, that 
land was a subject matter not directly 
amendable to the jurisdiction of the 
Courts of another state, however, much 
those courts might indirectly affect and 
operate upon it in controversies where 
the court, by reason of its jurisdiction 
over persons and the nature of the 
controversy, might coerce the execution 
of a conveyance of or other instrument 
encumbering such land. Id. at 193. 
The situation feared by the U.S. Supreme Court has 
actually occurred in the present case. The District has 
ordered a redistribution of the California real property and 
intends to enforce said order by requiring the Personal 
Representative to post a bond to insure such redistribution. 
The Court in Clarke, however affirmed the decision of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors specifically holding that 
the courts of South Carolina had no subject matter 
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jurisdiction over the Connecticut real property. Id. at 195 
(string cite omitted). 
Although the Utah Courts do not appear to have addressed 
these issues before, the above principles have been followed 
and upheld by a number of the other courts. Indeed, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that, "[t]he cases on the 
subject are numerous and so nearly unanimous that it would be 
useless to attempt to discuss them all". In Re Ray's Estate, 
287 P.2d 629, 635 (Wyo. 1955). The Wyoming Court then went on 
to state that "(they) regard it then as settled law that the 
devolution of real property in this state and the effect of 
the decedent's will must be determined by the laws of this 
state". Id. 
B. A Foreign Court has no Jurisdiction Over Property 
Not Found Within its Territorial Limits. 
The Courts in Clarke supra and the cases that followed 
have uniformly centered on the question of subject matter 
jurisdiction in denying foreign courts the right to adjudicate 
the disposition of foreign real property. The case of Durfee 
v. Duke. 375 U.S. 106, 107-108, 845 S.Ct. 242, 243 (1963) 
involves a dispute over bottomland on the Missouri River. 
Because the river is also the boundary between the states of 
Nebraska and Missouri an issue on appeal dealt with 
jurisdiction. Justice Stewart of the U.S. Supreme Court began 
his opinion with the basic undisputed premise that "[t]he 
Nebraska court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
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controversy only if the land in question was in Nebraska". 
In the case of Welch v. Trustees of Robert A. Welch 
Foundation. 465 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex.App. 1971) involving the 
courts of two (2) states interpreting the will of the 
deceased, the Texas Court of Appeals began by validating the 
principles set forth in Clarke and then went on to discuss the 
effect of a prior ruling from another state regarding Texas 
real property from an earlier case decided by the Texas 
Supreme Court: 
The mere fact that the courts of Ohio happen to 
have acted first in the matter is no more 
persuasive to us than the converse situation would 
be to the Ohio courts . . . Courts of a state which 
is not the situs of the land involved in a 
questioned devise, or devise in trust, are, 
generally speaking, without right to apply a law 
different from that of the situs, and their 
judgments assuming such a right are not protected 
by the "Full Faith and Credit" clause of the 
Federal Constitution, Art. 4, Section 1. Toledo 
Society for Crippled Children v. Hickok, 152 Tex. 
758, 261 S*W.2d 692 (1953). 
This result is not surprising as the full faith and 
credit doctrine requires a foreign court to have subject 
matter jurisdiction, Pur fee v. Duke Supra at 111, and such 
jurisdiction is lacking with regard to real property outside 
of a foreign courts territorial limits. 
One of the most recent cases affirming the principles in 
Clarke is that of Haves v. Gulf Oil Corp., 821 F.2d 285 (5th 
Cir. 1987). In Haves, the Fifth Circuit Federal Court was 
forced to examine whether a Federal District Court could 
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over real property 
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situated outside of its territorial boundaries by virtue of 
its diversity jurisdiction over the parties. The "local 
action rule" discussed by the Court is similar to the 
conflicts issues above in that it: 
". . . prevents courts unfamiliar with local 
property rights and laws from interfering with 
title to real property which must be recorded under 
a unitary set of rules to keep it free of 
conflicting encumbrances. These local rules ensure 
that real property actions will be tried in a 
convenient forum and that orderly notice to all 
interested parties - through Colorado land title 
records - will be facilitated." Ld. at 290 
In denying the Federal District Court's claim of 
jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit stated as follows: "In short, 
overwhelming precedent, including cases from this Circuit, 
which hold that a court sitting in one state cannot adjudicate 
title to land situated in a different state, and numerous 
salutary reasons for continuing the local action rule to 
determine subject matter jurisdiction, compel reversal of the 
district court's judgment." Id. 
In the matter before this Court, the California Superior 
Court has already demonstrated its unwillingness to allow Utah 
courts jurisdiction over California real property. Even 
though, at the time the California ancillary proceeding was 
initiated, a Utah Third District Court Decision awarding all 
property of the subject estate to Linda Anglesey and 
disinheriting Jones had been entered, the California Superior 
Court refused to grant the Utah judgment full faith and 
credit. A full evidentiary hearing was held by the California 
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Court, despite the fact that no opposition to the claims of 
Linda Anglesey had been filed, on the issues of the 
sufficiency of the will of the deceased an the effect of the 
California pretermitted child statute. 
It is clear from Clarke and its progeny, that any dispute 
Jones may have with the distribution of the estate's 
California real property, or the judgment of the California 
courts, cannot be bootstrapped into the Utah probate 
proceeding, but must be directed to the courts with the 
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over said property. 
POINT II 
THE STATE OF UTAH SHOULD NOT GIVE UP 
THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE DISPOSITION 
OF REAL PROPERTY WITHIN THIS STATE 
It should not be overlooked that a failure to reverse the 
decision of the District Court below will have far reaching 
effects on the Utah courts' ability to control the disposition 
of real property within the state• Utah courts, in attempting 
to indirectly affect property situated in California, must 
implicitly endorse the same authority to courts outside of 
Utah with regard to Utah property. 
Moreover, opening the door to the control of Utah real 
property by other states is a poor exchange for Utah. While 
Utah would be consigned to allowing any state to exert subject 
matter jurisdiction over Utah real property, in probate 
matters in the very least, Utah would only be able to do the 
same in situations where it also maintained personal 
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jurisdiction over parties which could be forced to accept the 
Utah Courts' mandates. In the present case for example, had 
the California real property been distributed to an individual 
outside of the jurisdiction of the Utah, rather than the 
Personal Representative Linda Anglesey, the District Court 
could not have ordered a redistribution of the estate. 
It is essential that Utah not erode the sovereignty of 
the state by allowing the disposition of Utah real property to 
be determined other than Utah law. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER TO POST A PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE'S BOND IS UNNECESSARY 
Jones petitioned the court below for an order requiring 
Personal Representative Linda Anglesey to post a personal 
representative's bond based upon the premise that he is 
entitled to one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, 
including all California real property. As indicated in the 
final accounting of the Personal Representative, the Utah 
estate has no assets to distribute to any party. In fact, 
said Personal Representative was forced to pay a number of the 
expenses and costs related to the death of her father out of 
her own pocket. 
The only assets that the District Court's order would 
affect, therefore, would be the real property situated in 
California. Requiring the Personal Representative to bond for 
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one-half 1/2) of said property is both unnecessary and 
inappropriate for the following reasons. First, the real 
property in question is no longer part of the estate of the 
deceased, having been distributed pursuant to the ancillary 
proceeding held in the California Superior Court and said 
proceeding having been closed. 
Second, as discussed above, the Utah District Court has 
no subject matter jurisdiction over said California real 
property and therefore has no power to require or affect the 
transfer thereof. Finally, and also discussed above, the mere 
fact that the Utah Third District Court maintains personal 
jurisdiction over the distributee of said California property, 
by virtue of her position as Personal Representative of the 
Utah probate estate, does not also grant said Court the right 
to coerce a transfer thereof and the District Courts attempt 
to do so is inappropriate and contrary to established common 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
Because a foreign court has no power or jurisdiction over 
real property located outside of its territorial limits, the 
law of the situs state, and even moreso the determination of 
a court in the situs state, is controlling. Moreover, it is 
important that Utah not throw away its own exclusive 
jurisdiction over Utah real property and in doing so erode to 
a large measure its sovereignty. 
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WHEREFORE, Appellant/Petitioner, the estate of Herbert 
Lee Jones, by and through Personal Representative Linda 
Anglesey prays that the order of the Third District Court 
below invalidating the judgment of a California Superior Court 
regarding California real property, and requiring Personal 
Representative Linda Anglesey to post a personal 
representative's bond in the amount of one-half (1/2) the 
value of said property be reversed. Further, it is prayed 
that the matter be remanded to the Third District Court with 
the direction that the Personal Representative's Petition be 
granted and the Utah probate estate be closed without 
inclusion of the subject California real property therein. 
DATED this / ? A day of December, 1991. 
BROWN, LARSON, JENKINS & HALLIDAY 
RicfhajM/L.1 Hall iday^ 
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WILFRED E. BRIESEMEISTER 
Attorney at law 
Greenleaf Square, Suite 370 
7200 S. Greenleaf Avenue 
Whittier, CA. 90602 
C213) 945 6504 
Attorney for Petitioner 
FILED 
Estate of 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
NO. SEP 17587 
HERBERT LEE JONES, 
also known as HERBERT 
L. JONES, 
Deceased. 
DECREE DETERMINING INTERESTS 
IN TESTATE ESTATE 
The petition of LINDA M. CAMERON, praying that the Court 
determine who is entitled to distribution of the estate of 
HERBERT LEE JONES, also known as HERBERT L. JONES, deceased, 
came on regularly for hearing on the 4th day of November, 
1987, at 9:00 A.M. in Department SE"W", the Honorable J, 
KIMBALL WALKER, Judge Presiding. Upon proof satisfactory to the 
Court, the Court finds that all notices of the time and place of 
hearing were given as required by law, that no written statements 
of Claimants were filed herein, and said matter having been heard, 
evidence both oral and documentary having been introduced, and 
gcpd czvse. appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that decedent was aware 
of the existence of his son, ROBERT LEE JONES, and that it was 
decedent's intention to omit the son from decedent's Will, and 
that upon proper petition for distribution, the entirety of 
the estate shall be distributed to LINDA Mc CAMERON, daughter 
of the decedent. 
OECHB67 DATEDs 
J. KIMBALL WALKER 
Judge of the Superior Court 
v©*_,v--tv. w w c-yj M. s#:«v. 
THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH THIS CERTIFICATE IS AT-
TACHED IS A FULL TCUF. AMD CCHRECT COPY OF THE 
ORIGINAL ON'FILE AMD OF RECORD IN MY OFFICE. 
DEC 1 A 1987 
ATTEST 10 
FRANK S. 2CL1N, County Clerk -nd L<c:-.-.i-r Cheer 
o f t h " Superior Court of California, Cou„ty of Los 
Angelas, 
BY kA^M. DEPUTY 
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
DEPARTMENT SOUTHEAST W HON. J. KIMBALL WALKER, JUDGE 
In the Estate of 
HERBERT LEE JONES, 
Deceased. 
No. SE P 17587 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
November 4, 19 87 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Executor: WILFRED E.' BRIESEMEISTER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
7200 Greenleaf Avenue 
Suite 37 0 
Whittier, California 90602 
ORIGINAL 
WILLI D. HILL, CSR 
Official Reporter 
1 NORWALK, CALIFORNIA? WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 19 87; 9:00 AM 
2 DEPARTMENT SOUTHEAST W HON. J. KIMBALL WALKER, JUDGE 
3 
4 THE COURT? No. 28, Herbert Jones, and No. 29, 
5 Herbert Jones. 
6 MR. BRIESEMEISTER: Wilfred Briesemeister 
7 representing the executor, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Have you been to the probate lawyer on 
9 these matters? 
10 MR. BRIESEMEISTER; Yes, we have, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: What did you find out about this Utah law 
12 vis-a-vis California? 
13 MR. BRIESEMEISTER: I think, as I tried to clarify, I 
14 think the probate attorney understood the distinction. 
15 We are not asking the court to apply Utah law. 
16 What we are merely indicating was that there was a finding 
17 of fact in the matter which was pending before the Utah 
18 probate court with regard to the intention of the 
19 testator. 
20 Now, we have here today a witness, the brother 
21 of the testator, if Your Honor wishes to have an 
22 evidentiary hearing, who would testify that the will 
23 itself, by the four corners which specifies that the one 
24 daughter be the sole heir, was intended by the testator to 
25 exclude the remaining child, the son. 
26 In addition, I have a sworn statement from the 
27 testator's wife to indicate that the other two potential 
28 pretermitted heirs were not in fact either natural children 
1 of nor adopted children of testator. 
2 THE COURT: We will put that on second call as well, 
3 counsel. You have other documents which I have to read, 
4 and we'll have to hear this later. 
5 MR. BRIESEMEISTER: Very well, Your Honor. 
6 (Proceedings were held in other matters.) 
7 THE COURT: No. 28 and 29, Herbert Jones. 
8 MR. BRIESEMEISTER: Wilfred Briesemeister appearing 
9 on behalf of the executor, Your Honor. 
10 We filed a 1080 petition in order to clarify the 
11 issue of pretermitted heir, which was an objection to the 
12 — or by the probate attorney. 
13 In addition, we have a witness who's the brother 
14 of the decedent, and my offer as a matter of proof is that 
15 his testimony would be, again, that the four corners of the 
16 holographic will setting forth that the executor be the 
17 sole devisee was in fact the intention of his brother and 
18 to exclude the other child, his son. 
19 The probate attorney raised also two additional 
20 parties as potential pretermitted heirs, and I have a 
21 signed and notarized statement by the wife of the decedent 
22 that neither individual, Everett Wright Jones nor Debra 
23 Allen, was a child, natural child or adopted child. 
24 THE COURT: Counsel, you're going to have to 
25 establish the issue of this pretermitted heir problem by 
26 some testimony that something more than just that he — his 
27 intent is expressed in the will. 
28 I think the statute is clear that you not only 
1 have to show that he intended to exclude an heir but that 
2 he knew that the heir existed, and that's the problem I 
3 think you have, and I don't know — you have to put on 
4 testimony on that* 
5 MR. BRIESEMEISTER: Your Honor, we have his brother 
6 who is prepared to testify that not only did the testator 
7 know the existence of his son — 
8 THE COURT: Then put him on. 
9 MR. BRIESEMEISTER: Yes, Your Honor. 
10 I call Spencer Jones. 
11 
12 SPENCER JONES, 
13 a petitioner's witness, was sworn and testified as follows: 
14 THE CLERK: Raise your right hand, sir. 
15 You do solemnly swear that the testimony you may 
16 give in the cause now pending before this court shall be 
17 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
18 help you God. 
19 THE WITNESS: I do. 
20 THE CLERK: Please be seated, sir, and state your 
21 name, please. 
22 THE WITNESS: Spencer Jones. 
23 
24 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
25 BY MR. BRIESEMEISTER: 
26 Q Mr. Jones, are you the brother of the deceased 
27 Herbert Lee Jones? 
2 8 A Right. 
1 Q And prior to Mr. Jones' death did you have 
2 occasion to discuss with Mr. Jones the will that he was to 
3 execute and to whom he wanted his estate to be 
4 distributed? 
5 A He wanted it all to go to his daughter Linda. 
6 Q Linda Cameron, who's the executor in this 
7 estate? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Do you recall any specific conversations during 
10 which Mr. Jones said that he wanted to exclude his son 
11 Robert Lee Jones? 
12 A Well, he wouldn't allow him on the property. He 
13 didn't want to have nothing to do with him and told him 
14 so. 
15 Q And do you recall whether Mr. Jones in addition 
16 made any comments to you about wanting his estate to go to 
17 Linda Cameron and none of it to go Robert Lee Jones? 
18 A I know that's the way he wanted it. He same as 
19 told me so. 
20 THE COURTs What did he say to you, sir? 
21 THE WITNESS: Well ~ 
22 THE COURT: When was the conversation? Who was 
23 present? And what was said? 
24 THE WITNESS: Well, just he and I, but then we were 
25 talking. 
26 THE COURT: Every time you were talking, and that was 
27 7 0 years, I presume. 
28 Let's get the specific dates and time. 
1 THE WITNESS: Well, I would say that in the last 
2 three or four years before he passed away is when he was 
3 having a problem with his son. 
4 THE COURT: What kind of problems was he having? 
5 THE WITNESS: Well, he wasn't very reliable. I guess 
6 he was dipping into the bank account. My brother was a 
7 little bit disabled; he was blind and — 
8 THE COURT: His son was around? is that correct? He 
9 was around your brother? 
10 THE WITNESS: Well, the son was there part of the 
11 time, but he didn't live there very long. 
12 THE COURT: Well, then at or about the time that this 
13 will was made where was the son residing? 
14 THE WITNESS: I really don't know. He was up around 
15 the foothills up north of Pomona somewhere• 
16 THE COURT: And when was the last conversation that 
17 you had with your brother wherein he mentioned anything 
18 about this son? 
19 THE WITNESS: Well, in the hospital he had been 
20 operated on for cancer. He didn't want him ~ anybody to 
21 J tell his son that he was in the hospital. He didn't want 
22 him around at all. 
23 THE COURT: When was the will made in relationship to 
24 this hospitalization? 
25 THE WITNESS: Made right while he was in bed. I 
26 wasn't in the room, but I knew about it. 
27 THE COURT: Did he say anything to you, while was in 
2 8 the hospital, about his son? 
1 THE WITNESS: Every time he was mentioned he didn't 
2 want him to know anything about him being in the hospital. 
3 THE COURT: But did he tell you that? 
4 THE WITNESS: He told it directly to me, 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 Who are these other people? 
7 MR. BRIESEMEISTER: Your Honor, there were two 
8 others, Everett Wright Jones and Debra Allen, who 
9 apparently had resided with the testator during the period 
10 of time approximately when the will was executed. 
11 I have a statement that has been notarized 
12 October 29, 1987 by one Mary Sumner, who was married to 
13 decedent. 
14 THE COURT: Offer it, please. 
15 MR. BRIESEMEISTER: I might also add, Your Honor, 
16 that notwithstanding the filing of 1080 petition, there has 
17 been no statement of interest filed by either the son — 
18 THE COURT: All right. 
19 The order will be granted as prayed. The 
20 affidavit will be ordered filed* 
21 The court finds that the deceased knew of and 
22 intended to exclude the child. 
23 Attorney order. 
24 MR. BRIESEMEISTER: Very well, Your Honor. 
25 Thank you very much. 
26 (Proceedings concluded.) 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
DEPARTMENT SOUTHEAST W HON. J. KIMBALL WALKER, JUDGE 
In the Estate of 
HERBERT LEE JONES, 
Deceased. 
No. SE P 17 587 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ) 
I, WILLI D. HILL, Official Reporter of the 
Superior Court of the State of California, for the County 
of Los Angeles, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages, 
1 through 6, inclusive, comprise a full, true, and correct 
transcript of the proceedings held in the above-entitled 
matter, reported by me on November 4, 19 87. 
Dated this 28th day of October, 1989. 
Official Reporter 
CSR NO. 2242 
EXHIBIT C 
ESTATE OP JONES •. JONES 
Cltett759 PJd 345 (UtahApp. 19M) 
prior motion to withdraw is required. E.g., 1. Wills *»158 
Lancaster. In either scenario, an eviden-
tiary hearing must ordinarily be held un-
less the record of a prior hearing shows 
petitioner is clearly not entitled to relief. 
See, e.g., Lancaster. If the direct route of 
filing a motion to withdraw is selected, 
further review must be in the form of 
appeal from denial of the motion and fail-
ure to appeal would ordinarily be conclu-
sive. E.g., Wells. However, where the 
failure to appeal from denial of the motion 
is due to counsel's omission or other good 
cause, review of the denial may be had by 
collateral action. E.g., Chess v. Smith. 
proper resolution of the collateral action 
will require an evidentiary hearing unless 
review of the transcript of the hearing on 
the motion to withdraw permits a decision 
as a matter of law. E.g., Lancaster. 
Utah 345 
A confidential relationship, required 
for presumption of undue influence, arises 
when one party, after having gained the 
trust and confidence of another, exercises 
extraordinary influence over the other par-
ty. 
2. Wills *=>163(2) 
If a confidential relationship exists be-
tween two parties to a transaction, and if 
the superior party benefits from the trans-
action, a presumption of undue influence is 
raised. 
3. Wills «=»163(2) 
The relationship of parent and child is 
not evidence of such confidential relation-
ship as to create presumption of undue 
influence. 
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ., 
concur. 
( O | MY NUMNR SYSTEM^ 
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF 
Herbert Lee JONES, Deceased, 
?. 
Robert Lee JONES, Appellant 
No. 880121-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 8, 1988. 
Son objected to probate of father's will 
drafted by daughter. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkin-
son, J., denied son's objections and he ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., 
held that (1) substantial evidence sup-
ported finding that there was no confiden-
tial relationship and no undue influence, 
and (2) son was a pretermitted child. 
Vacated and remanded. 
4. Wills 0=163(4) 
Undue influence by daughter, in the 
absence of a confidential relationship with 
father, would not be presumed solely be-
cause she actively participated in a drafting 
and execution of father's will under which 
she was sole beneficiary. 
5. WUls «=>166(4) 
Substantial evidence supported finding 
that there was no confidential relationship 
and no undue influence exercised by daugh-
ter who drafted and was sole beneficiary of 
her father's will 
6. Wills «=»489(5) 
Unequivocal language of pretermitted 
child statute providing that testator's fail-
ure to provide in his or her will for a child 
then living is presumptively intentional un-
less intent to omit "appears from the will" 
itself, rendered evidence outside the four 
corners of an unambiguous will, including 
declarations of the decedent, inadmissible 
to rebut statutory presumption that testa-
tor's failure to provide for living child in 
his will was unintentional. U.C.A.1953, 75-
2-302(lXa). 
7. Descent and Distribution «=»47(2) 
A testamentary disposition of entire 
estate is alone insufficient to establish that 
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omission o{ a child from a will is intention-
al. U.C.A.1953, 7&-2-302(lXa). 
8. Descent and Distribution *»47(2) 
To rebut statutory presumption 
against disinheritance, a will must either 
mention claimant child by name or fairly 
and clearly express an intention on the part 
of testator to exclude claimant as part of a 
mentioned group or class. 
9. Descent and Distribution *»47(2) 
Statutory presumption against disin-
heritance of son was not rebutted by words 
of will "granting" daughter "to be sole 
beneficiary" of estate, and since no men-
tion of son was made either by name or by 
class, son was pretermitted child. U.C.A. 
1953, 75-2-302(lXa). 
Stephen D Swindle, R. Stephen Marshall 
(argued), Thomas E. Nelson, Salt Lake 
City, for appellant, Robert Lee Jones, Van 
Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. 
Alan M. Williams (argued), West Jordan, 
for respondent, Linda Cameron. 
Before JACKSON, BENCH and 
GARFF, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Robert Lee Jones appeals from the judg-
ment and order denying his objections to 
probate of a will drafted by his sister, 
Linda Cameron, and concluding he was not 
entitled to a share of his father's estate as 
a pretermitted child. He presents three 
principal issues: (1) Should the trial court 
have presumed as a matter of law that 
there was undue influence exerted by his 
sister either because of the mere fact of 
the father/daughter relationship or be-
cause she was the drafter of the will and 
its sole beneficiary? (2) Even without the 
operation of such a presumption, is the trial 
court's failure to find either a confidential 
relationship or no undue influence clearly 
erroneous? (3) Even if the will is valid, is 
he nonetheless entitled. to an intestate 
share of his father's estate as a pretermitr 
ted child? We vacate the judgment and 
order of the trial court 
Linda Cameron ("Cameron") and Robert 
Lee Jones ("Robert") are the surviving nat-
ural children of Herbert Lee Jones 
("Jones"), who died in Salt Lake County on 
July 5, 1985 after living with Cameron for 
approximately two monthSc In late April, 
1985, Jones was admitted to a California 
hospital for cancer surgery. When Camer-
on found this out, she travelled to Califor-
nia and visited Jones in the hospital on 
April 30c He expressed concern about his 
salvage grease business affairs and bills 
and asked her to take care of them. After 
looking through his papers for many hours 
that night, she returned to the hospital on 
May 1 and told Jones he needed to sign a 
power of attorney so she could put her 
name on his checking account and conduct 
his affairs. When he assented, she hand-
wrote the contested document, which ini-
tially stated: 
1 May 1985 
I, HERBERT LEE JONES grant power 
of ATTORNEY to my daughter; LINDA 
M. CAMERON. 
During the ensuing conversation, as report-
ed by Cameron, Jones indicated that—if he 
didn't make it—he didn't want Robert to 
get anything from his estate; he wanted 
Cameron to have it all. Cameron told him 
if that was so, he needed a will, to which 
Jones responded, "Okay. Do it" Carney 
on then changed the period after her name 
to a comma and added the following words 
to the previously drafted document 
AND TO BE EXECUTER [sic] AND 
SOLE BENEFICIARY TO 
MY ESTATE. 
Cameron then read the document to her 
father. He looked at it and signed it in the 
presence of two witnesses, Volita Jones 
and Terri Hurst The trial court found 
that the second part had already been add-
ed to the document when Jones signed it 
although Robert disputed that point 
Robert agreed that the May 1 document 
qualified as a will, but challenged its admis-
sion to probate on the grounds that his 
father lacked testamentary capacity and 
ESTATE OF JONES v. JONES 
Q u u 7 N T2d MS (UuaApp. IMS) 
that the document was obtained by Camer- whom trust has 
on's undue influence. He also claimed 
that, even if the will was not so obtained, 
he was entitled to an intestate share of his 
father's estate as a pretermitted child un-
der Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-302(1) (1978) 
because the will itself did not show an 
intention to disinherit him. At trial. Robert 
repeatedly objected to the admission of 
statements made by Jones to Cameron and 
others to prove Jones's intent to disinherit 
his son. including statements that Jones 
believed Robert had stolen some money 
from him. 
The trial judge made the following rele-
vant findings: Jones had testamentary ca-
pacity when the wfll was executed; there 
was no confidential relationship between 
Cameron and her father at the time she 
drafted the document for him; and the 
making of the will was not procured by her 
undue influence. The trial judge concluded 
that the language of the will itself showed 
the intent of the decedent to intentionally 
omit Robert from the will, thereby preclud-
ing him from taking any part of Jones's 
estate by virtue of the operation of the 
pretermitted child statute. He added that, 
if the extrinsic evidence of Jones's oral 
declarations was considered, it would only 
reinforce that conclusion. 
Utah 347 
been reposed) benefits 
from the transaction, a presumption of un-
due influence * is raised. Von Hake v. 
Thomas 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985); 
Robertson v. Campbell, 674 PM 1226 
(Utah 1983). In such a case, the burden 
shifts to the superior party to prove the 
absence of any unfairness by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Baker v. Pattee, 684 
P.2d 632, 637 (Utah 1984). 
A few relationships are presumed to be 
confidential, such as that of attorney and 
client Webster, 742 P.2d at 1206; see In 
re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d 
682 (1956). In all other relationships the 
existence of a confidential relationship is a 
question of fact Webster, 142 P.2d at 
1206; Baker, 684 P.2d at 636. 
On appeal. Robert asserts that, as a mat-
ter of law, a confidential relationship 
should have been presumed between Jones 
and Cameron as parent and child, giving 
rise in turn to a presumption that she ex-
erted undue influence over him in order to 
be named as his sole beneficiary under the 
will. 
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP AND 
UNDUE INFLUENCE 
[1.2] A confidential relationship arises 
when one party, after having gained the 
trust and confidence of another, exercises 
extraordinary influence over the other par* 
ty. Webster v. Lekmer, 742 P.2d 1203. 
1206 (Utah 1987). If a confidential rela-
tionship exists between two parties to a 
transaction, and if the superior party (in 
1. In the context of a testamentary disposition, 
"undue influence" may be established 
without showing any physical coercion or re-
statist.... fflx whatever form It steyttppeer 
it must, nevertheless, be made to appear from 
competent evidence that the will of the one 
accused of practicing undue influence domi-
nated the will of the testator—that the testa* 
mem is in fact and effect the will of the 
accused and not that of the testator. 
In rt Bryan's Estate, S2 Utah 390, 25 P.2d 602. 
610(1933). 
[3] The doctrine of confidential relation-
ship rests upon the principle of inequality 
between the parties and implies a position 
of superiority occupied by one of the par* 
ties over another. Bradbury v. Rasmus* 
sen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710, 718 
(1966). However, the mere relationship of 
parent and child does not constitute evi-
dence of such confidential relationship as to 
create a presumption of undue influence. 
Nelson v. Nelson, 80 Utah 2d 80, 513 P.2d 
1011, 1018 (1*78);' Bradbury, 401 P.2d at 
718.* 
While kinship may be a factor in deter* 
mining the existence of a legally signifi-. 
2. Accord Clow
 v. Chkafo Tttk 6 Trust Co» 9 
IlUpp^d 16S, 292 NJL2d 44 (1972); Burns v. 
Afotto, 252 Iowa 306, 105 N.W.2d 217 (I960); 
Obo* « Mtrxbman, 233 Kan. lOSl 66S PJd 147 
(1983); Piatt *. Pbtzki, 277 Mich. 700. 270 N.W. 
192 (1937); WuUtts v. WUUtts, 254 N.C 136,118 
$.Z2d 548 (mi); EOis v. Potter, 455 ?2d 92 
(OkLApp.2969); JmarsoU v. JnfrsoU. 263 Or. 
376, 502 P.2d 59a (1972); Estat* of Wann. 176 
Pa£uper. 498, 108 JL2d 820 (1954); lacomatti v. 
PrasswOi, 494 S.W.2d 496 (TennApp.1973). 
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cant confidential relationship, there must 
be a showing, in addition to the kinship, a 
reposal of confidence by one party and 
the resulting superiority and influence on 
the other party Mere confidence in 
one person by another is not sufficient 
alone to constitute such a relationship. 
Bradbury, 401 P.2d at 713. 
Without distinguishing Nelson and 
Bradbury, in which the transacting parties 
were parents and their child or one raised 
as their child, appellant bases his argument 
on the general statement, in a case involv-
ing only a trustor/trustee relationship, that 
"[t]here are a few relationships (such as 
parent-child, attorney-client, trustee-cestui) 
which the law presumes to be confidential." 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 
(Utah 1978). This unsupported obiter die-
turn was, unfortunately, reiterated in Bak-
er, 684 P.2d at 637, another case in which 
no familial relationship between the trans-
acting parties was claimed 
Notwithstanding this dicta, we believe 
that the rule in Bradbury reflects the cur-
rent state of Utah law, Le.v the relationship 
of parent and child does not, in and of 
itself, establish a confidential relationship 
giving rise to a presumption of unfair deal-
ing., The Bradbury opinion has been re-
cently cited and quoted with approval for 
its pronouncements on confidential relation-
ships in general. See Webster, 742 P.2d at 
1206; Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 769. More 
importantly, subsequent to Baker, the 
unanimous court cited Nelson and Brad-
bury as authority for its conclusion that a 
relationship as brother and sister-in-law is 
not sufficient, standing alone, to prove a 
confidential relationship, although the ex-
istence of a confidential relationship could 
be proved otherwise. Cunningham v. 
3. Appellant also makes an unsupported argu-
ment thai, even in the absence of a confidential 
relationship, undue influence by Cameron 
should be presumed as a matter of law because 
she actively participated in the drafting and 
execution of the will under which she is sole 
beneficiary. His position is, however, contrary 
to the rule set forth in In re Bryan's Estate, 25 
?2d at 609-610, that the presumption of undue 
influence applies in these circumstances if the 
beneficiary was in a confidential relationship 
Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 563 (Utah 
1984). 
[4] Because there is no presumption of 
a confidential relationship arising solely 
from the fact that parties to a transaction 
are parent and child, the trial court correct-
ly declined to find a confidential relation-
ship as a matter of law and left the burden 
on Robert to prove that there was, in fact, 
a confidential relationship and undue influ-
ence.1 
[5] In its findings of fact, the trial court 
determined that no such relationship exist-
ed at the time the will was drafted and 
executed and that no undue influence had 
been exerted on Jones. The findings of the 
trial court on these questions must be giv-
en considerable deference and will only be 
reversed on appeal if they are clearly erro-
neous. Webster, 742 P.2d at 1206. See 
Utah R.Civ.Pe 52(a). Because there is sub-
stantial record evidence to support these 
findings, we will not disturb them on ap-
peal 
PRETERMITTED CHILD 
Appellant next argues that he is entitled 
to an intestate share of his father's estate 
in spite of the May 1 will because the 
language of the will itself does not suffi-
ciently evidence Jones's intent to disinherit 
him. 
The relevant provisions of the statute in 
effect at the time of Jones's death state: 
(1) If a testator fails to provide in his 
will for any of his children or issue of a 
deceased child, the omitted child or issue 
receives a share in the estate equal in 
value to that which he would have re-
ceived if the testator had died intestate 
unless: 
with the testator. See Miller v. Livingstone, 31 
Utah 415. SS P. 338, 342 (1906) (rejecting any 
presumption of undue influence by one who 
directs the drafting of a will under which he or 
she is to take as sole beneficiary). See also the 
cases reaching a similar result collected in An-
notation, Presumption or Inference of Undue In-
fluence from Testamentary Gift to Relative, 
friend, or Associate of Person Preparing Will or 
Procuring its Execution, 13 A.LJL3d 381, 390-97 
(1967). 
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(a) It appears from the will that the 
omission was intentional[.] 
Utah Code Ann. J 75-2-302(lXa) (1978) 
(emphasis added).4 
Construing a prior pretermission statute 
allowing a child omitted from a parent's 
will to take an intestate share "unless it 
appears that such omission was intention-
al/' • the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
testator's failure to provide for a child or 
issue of a deceased child constituted a re-
buttable presumption that the omission 
was unintentional. In re NevoelVs Estate, 
78 Utah 463, 5 P.2d 230, 236-37 (1931). In 
the absence of the more restrictive statu-
tory language "from the will," emphasized 
above, evidence extrinsic to the will itself, 
including declarations of the testator, was 
held admissible to rebut the presumption 
and establish that the omission was inten-
tional. Id. 5 P.2d at 236. 
The statute applicable in the instant case 
still extends the presumption against disin-
heritance to children born before execution 
of the will. See id.; EstaU of Uliscni, 372 
N.W.2d 759, 761 (Minn.App.1985) (applying 
pretermission statute that, like Utah's, cov-
ers living and afterborn children). Thus, it 
was Cameron's burden to show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the omis-
sion of Robert was intentional. See In re 
NewelVs Estate, 5 P.2d at 24CM1; Estate 
ofErvin, 399 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Minn^pp. 
1987). 
[6] We agree with appellant, however, 
that the holding in Newell pertaining to the 
4. Under the statute is recently amended by 
Laws 19SS. ch. 110, § 2 (effective April 25. 
1988), only those children who were born or 
adopted after the execution of a will (or, if 
deceased, their isst") can claim a share in a 
parent's estate as a pretermitted child. Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-2-302(lXa) (1988). This 
change brings Utah's pretermitted child statute 
more in line with Uniform Probate Code 
§ 2-302 (19S2) (although the UPC provision 
does not apply to the issue of deceased after-
born children), which is based on the presump-
tion that a testator's failure to provide for a 
child living at the time the will was executed 
was intentional See note 7, infra: Comment, 
Articles U and ID of the Uniform Probau Code as 
Enacted m Utah, 1976 B.Y.UJ-Rev. 425. 434. 
Because appellant was alive at the time his 
father's will was executed, be would have no 
claim as a pretermitted child if Jones had died 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence was su-
perseded by the legislature's adoption of 
the quoted language, Le., unless "it ap-
pears from the will," in section 76-2-
302(lXa) (1978). In construing any legisla-
tive enactment, we must give effect to the 
legislature's underlying intent, American 
Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 
1984), and assume that each term in the 
statute was used advisedly. West Jordan 
v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). 
The plain meaning of the restrictive lan-
guage in section 75-2-302UXa) (1978) is 
that a testator's failure to provide in his or 
her will for a child then living is presump-
tively unintentional unless an intent to omit 
"appears from the will" itself. See 2 W. 
Page, Page on Wills § 21.109 at 551, 553 
(W. Bowe & D. Parker ed. 1960). This 
unequivocal statutory language renders ev-
idence outside the four corners of an unam-
biguous will, including declarations of the 
decedent, inadmissible to rebut the statu-
tory presumption.* Accord Estate of 
Smith, 9 CaL3d 74, 106 CaLRptr. 774, 507 
P.2d 78 (1973); Smith v. Crook, 160 CaL 
App.3d 245, 206 CaLRptr. 524 (1984) (Cali-
fornia statute, like Utah's, sayB "unless it 
appears from the will that such omission 
was intentional"); /* the Matter of the 
Estate of Hilton, 98 N.M. 420, 649 P.2d 488 
(App.1982) (interpreting identical statutory 
subsection), cert denied, 98 N.M. 478, 649 
P.2d 1391; In re EstaU of Cooke, 96 Idaho 
48, 524 P.2d 176, 182 (1973) (statute says 
"unless it appears that such omission was 
after the effective date of the 1988 amendment 
to this section. 
5. When any testator omits to provide in his 
will for any of his children or for the issue of 
any deceased child, unless it appears that such 
omission was intentional such child or the 
issue of such child must have the same share 
in the estate of the testator as if he had died 
intestate.... 
1917 Utah CompXaws § 6341. 
6. The statements to the contrary in Wellman & 
Gordon, Uniformity m State Inheritance Laws: 
How UPC Article I! Has fared in Nine Enact* 
menu, 1976 B.Y.UJLRev. 357, 373 and BYU 
Journal of Legal Studies, Summary of Utah Pro-
bau Law 86 (1986) should, therefore, be dis-
regarded. 
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intentional"); Crump v. Freeman, 614 
P.2d 1096, 1097 (Okl.1980) (same statutory 
language as in Cooke). See Royce v. Es-
tate of Denby, 117 N.H. 893, 379 A.2d 
1256,1258 (1977). The purpose of the pret-
ermission statute is to protect the omitted 
child's right to take unless the will itself 
gives clear expression to an intentional 
omission. See Crump, 614 P.2d at 1097. 
Although this part of the Utah statute 
has been criticized as tending to defeat a 
testator's actual intent and prevent inten-
tional disinheritance,7 it is not our function 
to relegislate and set out a rule different 
from that clearly expressed in the statute. 
See In the Matter of Jackson, 117 N.H. 
898, 379 A.2d 832, 835 (1977). As the edito-
rial board comment to section 75-2-502 
(copied from the official comment to Uni-
form Probate Code § 2-302) points out, any 
potentially harsh results can be avoided by 
the testator. 
To preclude operation of this section it 
is not necessary to make any provision, 
even nominal in amount, for a testator's 
present or future children; a simple re-
cital in the will that the testator intends 
to make no provision for then living chil-
dren o o. would meet the requirement of 
subdivision 1(a). 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-302 editorial board 
comment (1978). 
[7-9] The only relevant words appear* 
ing within the confines of Jones's terse will 
are those "granting" Cameron "to be sole 
beneficiary" of his estate. There is no 
mention of Robert by name or by class. 
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the 
trial court, we hold that this language is 
insufficient to rebut the statutory presump-
7. Wellman 6 Gordon, supra note 6, at 373-74. 
[Uniform Probate Code] Section 2-302 is de-
signed ... to support testamentary intention 
by mitigating the effects of unintentional 
tion that Jones unintentionally failed to 
provide for his son in his will. A testamen-
tary disposition of the entire estate is alone 
insufficient to establish that the omission 
of a child from a will is intentional 
Crump, 614 P.2d at 1099. In order to rebut 
the statutory presumption, the testator's 
intent to disinherit a child living at the time 
of the will's execution must appear in 
strong and convincing language on the face 
of the will. See Smith v. Crook, 206 Cai. 
Rptr. at 526. The will must either mention 
the claimant child by name or fairly and 
clearly express an intention on the part of 
the testator to exclude the claimant as part 
of a mentioned group or class. In re Mat-
ter of the Estate of Hilton, 649 P.2d at 
495. See Estate ofHirschi 113 Cal.App.3d 
681, 170 CaLRptr. 186, 188 (1980); Estate 
of Hester, 671 P.2d 54 (Okl.1983). 
Because the statutory presumption 
against disinheritance stands unrehutted, 
the trial court erroneously held that Robert 
was not a pretermitted child under our 
statute. Accordingly, the judgment and 
order of the trial court is vacated and the 
case is remanded for entry of judgment in 
favor of appellant in accordance with this 
opinion. We have considered the remain-
ing issues raised by the parties and find 
them meritless. No costs are awarded. 
GARFF and BENCH, JJ., concur. 
(o | KIY UWIMt SYS71M > 
disinheritance. When a living child is omit-
ted from a will, however, it is probable that 
the omission was intentional. 
UL at 373. 
EXHIBIT D 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Attorneys for Petitioner Robert E. Jones 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
HERBERT LEE JONES, 
deceased 
ORDER 
Probate No. 85-736 
The following matters came on for hearing before the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya of the above-entitled court on January 
16, 1990, at 9:00 a.m.: Petition for an Order Confirming the 
Prior Decision of Formal Probate of the Decedent's Will and for 
Formal Appointment of Linda Anglesey as Personal Representative; 
for an Order Decreeing that Robert Lee Jones is a Pretermitted 
Child as Determined by the Decision of the Utah Appellate Court; 
for an Order Approving the Final Accounting; and for Discharge of 
the Personal Representative, and an Amended Counter-Petition for 
an Order Denying the Personal Representative's Petition for 
Approval of Final Settlement, an Order Requiring the Personal 
Representative to Provide an Accounting of all Property, 
-1-
Including the Property'in the State of California; for an Order 
Decreeing that Robert Lee Jones is a Pretermitted Heir; for 
Denying Attorney Fees; for Formal Appointment of Robert Lee Jones 
as Successor Personal Representative; and for an Order Requiring 
the Personal Representative to Surrender all Records, 
Accountings, and other Documents, or Post Bond. Petitioner 
Anglesey was represented by Richard L. Halliday of the law firm 
of Neider, Ward, & Hutchinson. Counterpetitioner Jones was 
represented by R. Stephen Marshall of the law firm of Van Cott, 
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. Having heard the argument of 
counsel and having considered the memoranda filed by the parties, 
and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. That Robert Lee Jones is a pretermitted heir. 
2. That the California decree awarding the real 
property owned by the decedent, Herbert Lee Jones, at the time of 
his death to Linda Anglesey was wholely invalid and that said 
property or the proceeds from the sale thereof should be 
distributed to all the heirs of the decedent. 
3. That Linda Anglesey is not removed from her 
position as Personal Representative. 
4. That the Personal Representative, Linda Anglesey 
is required to post a bond in the sum of one-half (1/2) of the 
-2-
amount of'the entire estate including the value of all real and 
personal property or the proceeds from the sale thereof. 
5, That the Court reserves its ruling on the Personal 
Representative's petition to close the estate and distribute the 
assets and on the Personal Representative's request for 
attorney's fees. 
DATED this day of February, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
James S. Sawaya 
District Judge 
-3-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order to be hand-delivered, this lb day of 
February, 1990, to the following: 
Richard L. Halliday 
Neider, Ward & Hutchinson 
7050 Union Park Avenue, Suite 420 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
frV)HwUil 
-4-
EXHIBIT E 
Salt Lake County Utah 
JUL 191985 
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